Security and privacy by architecture

The public product has nowhere to send a client file

“We delete uploads” is weaker than not accepting an upload. The public application is static and processes matter data inside the browser.

Data flow

  • The user selects a local PDF or saved matter file.
  • Browser code reads the file in the current tab; there is no upload endpoint.
  • Working state remains in tab memory.
  • Export and save actions create downloads on the user’s device.
  • Closing the tab ends the in-memory session unless the user saved a file.

Release controls

  • The deployment is built from a clean public artifact, not from the repository’s private historical commits.
  • The clean application must contain a null embedded matter.
  • A privacy audit scans output for local paths, common secret formats, case-number patterns and tokens derived from any local corpus manifest.
  • Content Security Policy sets connect-src to none for the application and blocks framing, plugins, camera, microphone and location access.

Limits users should understand

Local processing does not make an endpoint safe if the device, browser, downloads folder or sharing channel is compromised. The product cannot control a user’s device backup, browser extensions, screen capture or the method used to transmit an exported file.

Do not load a client matter on a shared or untrusted device. Use the firm’s approved encrypted channel for any saved matter file. This security page and the site security file are the current public reporting references; do not send client records to guessed email addresses.

Continue the workflow